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The adverse eﬀects of excessive alcohol consumption are well-known. Of great
concern to policy makers is to understand the potentially diﬀerent drivers for con-
sumers of diﬀerent levels of alcohol consumption. Using unit record data from the
Australian Drug Strategy Household Surveys, this paper estimates an Ordered Gen-
eralised Extreme Value model to identify the factors that inﬂuence diﬀering levels
of alcohol consumption. Unlike previous studies using inﬂexible approaches such as
Ordered Probits/Logits or Multinomial Logits, the OGEV model is both ﬂexible and
consistent with random utility maximization. The results suggest that important
drivers are: age; income; education; gender; and own and cross-prices.
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11 Introduction and Background
The misuse of alcohol represents one of the leading causes of preventable death, illness
and injury in many societies throughout the world. Murray and Lopez (1997) estimate
that globally in 1990, alcohol contributed to 773,600 deaths, 19.3 million years of life
lost and 47.7 million disability adjusted life years. Due to the broad range and severity
of alcohol-related consequences, the monitoring of alcohol use and the formulation of
eﬀective policies constitute a major challenge to policy makers worldwide.
A great number of empirical studies have been published on alcohol consumption
using unit-record data ranging from: price eﬀects (for example, Manning, Blumberg,
and Moulton 1995, Chaloupka and Wechsler 1996, Saﬀer and Chaloupka 1998, Farrell,
Manning, and Finch 2003); to policies such as taxation and legal drinking age (Saﬀer and
Grossman 1987, Coate and Grossman 1993, Laixuthai and Chaloupka 1993, Saﬀer and
Chaloupka 1994, Kenkel 1996); to labour productivity (Berger and Leigh 1988, Mullahy
and Sindelar 1993); and to individual social, economic and demographic characteristics
(Cameron and Williams 2001, Lee 2003, Zhao and Harris 2003). Due to the nature of unit-
record data, usually obtained from surveys where discrete levels rather than the actual
quantities of consumption are available, discrete choice models are often used in these
studies. Probit or Logit models are usually estimated when the focus is on an individual’s
decision to participate, or not, in the consumption of alcohol (see, for example, Cameron
and Williams 2001).
Where data on multiple choices of levels of alcohol consumption are available, the
discrete choices often exhibit a natural ordering representing increasing consumption lev-
els. In these cases, the literature has predominantly quantiﬁed the eﬀects of personal
demographics and policy variables using Ordered Probit models. The choices of levels
of consumption are modelled through a single latent variable that relates the propen-
sity of alcohol consumption to the observed outcomes (see, for example, Chaloupka and
Laixuthai 1997). It is well known that the Ordered Probit model is inﬂexible in speci-
ﬁcation and also inconsistent with a consumer preference framework of Random Utility
Maximisation (RUM). A more ﬂexible model is the frequently used Multinomial Logit
(MNL) model, which allows for separate latent equations for alternative choices and which
is consistent with the RUM (see, for example, Lee 2003) speciﬁcation. However, the MNL
2model does not account for the fact that the discrete choices are ordered. Moreover, MNL
models possess the undesirable property of “Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives”
(IIA), which implies that the probability ratio of any two choices is independent of the
probabilities of other choices (Greene 2003). This property follows from the assumption
that the disturbances of diﬀerent latent equations or the unobserved stochastic compo-
nents of utility for alternative choices are independent.
The objective of this paper is to estimate an Ordered Generalised Extreme Value
(OGEV) model to study the levels of alcohol consumption, using the Australian Drug
Strategy Household Survey data. The OGEV model was proposed by Small (1987) to
deal with ordered discrete data. It belongs to the class of the Generalised Extreme Value
(GEV) models, as proposed by McFadden (1978), which embody the MNL model as
a special case. The OGEV model allows for correlations between the random utility
components of choices that are of close proximity in the ordering. Thus, it is a ﬂexible
RUM model that accounts for the ordered nature of the discrete choices. The OGEV
model will be applied in this paper to study the impacts of own and related drug prices,
income, and other individual social and demographic factors on an individual’s choice of
the level of alcohol consumption. For policy purposes, the OGEV model is preferable
than an Ordered Probit, as, for example, it allows variables to have diﬀering eﬀects and
signiﬁc a n c el e v e l sa c r o s st h ed i ﬀerent levels of consumption. Therefore this is particularly
apt for policy speciﬁcally targeted at “heavy” users.
According to a report by the World Health Organisation (1999), Europe reported
the highest per capita consumption of alcohol (at 8.60 litres per year), followed by the
Americas (6.98 litres) and the Western Paciﬁc region (5.54 litres). Signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in patterns of alcohol consumption also exist within regions. In countries such as Italy or
Spain, “heavy” drinkers tend to spread their consumption throughout the week, thereby
reducing the risk of acute, but not of chronic, consequences of drinking. In contrast, in
Ireland and the UK, drinkers are more likely to drink heavily once or twice per week,
increasing the risk of acute consequences. Per capita alcohol consumption in Australia
was 7.8 litres for the ﬁnancial year 1999/2000 (World Drink Trends 2002), ranking 19th
in the world, not far behind major European countries and higher than the US, Canada
and New Zealand in terms of per capita consumption. The heaviest drinkers in Australia
3are those under 25 years of age, while in New Zealand nearly half the alcohol sold is
consumed predominantly by the 10 percent heaviest male drinkers.
While it is widely recognised that excessive use of alcohol can be detrimental to health,
in recent years a number of health beneﬁts have been linked with a moderate and regular
pattern of small amounts of consumption. Examples of this include reduced risks of heart
disease and some preliminary evidence of protection against diabetes (National Health
and Medical Research Council 2001). By including time dummies in the estimations, the
current study involving nearly 40,000 individuals over the years of 1995 to 2001 will be
able to identify any such shift in consumption patterns over time.
2T h e O G E V M o d e l
We start with the Generalised Extreme Value (McFadden 1978) class of the Random Util-
ity Maximization (RUM) models, where indirect utility function for consumer i choosing
alternative j is given by
Uij = Vij + εij (i =1 ,...N and j =1 ,...J).( 1 )
Vij is the observable part of the utility that is typically assumed to be a linear (in the




iβj + εij (i =1 ,...N and j =1 ,...J).( 2 )
εij is a random disturbance term accounting for unobserved individual tastes and prefer-
ences. Let Yi (j =1 ,...J) indicates the choice made by consumer i. The consumer is as-
sumed to choose the choice with the maximum utility. That is, Yi = j if Uij >U ik,∀k 6= j.
When the marginal distributions for εij are Extreme Value distributions, the class of GEV
models results.
When the disturbances εij in equation (2) are assumed to independently and identically
follow a Type I Extreme Value distribution, equation (2) leads to the familiar MNL model
(Maddala 1983), where the probability of individual i choosing alternative j is given by2
1Note only the case where data for the explanatory variables are individual speciﬁc rather than choice
speciﬁc is considered. The model applicable to data with choice-speciﬁc attributes is often termed Con-
ditional Logit model (Greene 2003).
2For identiﬁcation β0 = 0 (Maddala 1983)
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(i =1 ,...N and j =1 ,...J).( 3 )
Although the MNL has been applied to modelling discrete levels of alcohol consump-
tion (Lee 2003), and indeed to other applications with ordered discrete data, it does not
account for any inherent ordering in the discrete choice data. Related to this point is
another unattractive feature, that of IIA, where the probability odd between any two
choices is independent of other choices (Fry and Harris 1996).
Small (1987) proposed the Ordered Generalised Extreme Value (OGEV) model, from
the GEV class, that is more suited for ordered discrete outcomes. While maintaining the
ﬂexibility of allowing the explanatory variables to have diﬀerent coeﬃcients and signiﬁ-
cance levels for the utility attached to respective choices (unlike the Ordered Probit), the
OGEV model also relaxes the restriction of independence between the unobservable char-
acteristics across diﬀerent choices. Speciﬁcally, the OGEV model allows for correlations
between the disturbances of outcomes that are “close to” each other in the ordering. The
further the two outcomes j and k are located from one another, the smaller is the correla-
tion between the two disturbances εj and εk (j,k =1 ,...,J).W h e n|j − k| is greater than
a pre-selected integer M, the correlation is zero. Such a pattern of correlation appears
likely, especially for an addictive good such as alcohol, with heavy drinking likely to be
highly correlated with moderate drinking, but much less correlated with the abstainers,
and so on.
It is possible to allow the window of correlation M, across nearby outcomes to be
arbitrarily large. However, this signiﬁcantly increases the complexity of the model and the
associated diﬃculties in the maximisation procedures used in the estimation (Small 1987).
In this paper a standard OGEV model is considered with only the adjacent outcomes
correlated (M =1 ) . It only involves one additional parameter ρ relative to the MNL
model. Although it cannot be written explicitly in closed form, the correlation between
the adjacent outcomes is inversely related to the parameter ρ (Small 1987).
The associated standard OGEV probabilities for M =1have the form
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(exp(ρ−1Vij−1)+e x p( ρ−1Vij))
ρ−1 +( e x p ( ρ−1Vij)+e x p( ρ−1Vij+1))
ρ−1i
PJ+1
r=1 (exp(ρ−1Vir−1)+e x p( ρ−1Vir))
ρ
with the convention that exp(ρ−1Vi0)=e x p ( ρ−1ViJ+1)=0and 0 <ρ≤ 1.
As ρ → 1, OGEV probabilities converge to MNL ones. Therefore a simple parameter
restriction based test (ρ =1 )is one of the OGEV versus MNL, which is also implicitly
a test of ordering versus non-ordering of the outcomes in the choice set. Note that as
ρ → 0, the associated cumulative distribution function is a degenerate one, but one still
consistent with RUM (Small 1987).
3T h e D a t a
The data used in this study are drawn from the three most recent Australian National
Drug Strategy Household Surveys (NDSHS)(National Drug Strategy Household Survey
1995, 1998, 2001). These are nationally representative surveys of the Australian popu-
lation aged 14 and above. While the 1995 and 1998 surveys covered around 4,000 and
10,000 individuals respectively, almost 27,000 people provided information in the 2001
survey on their drug use patterns, attitudes and behaviour. Individuals were person-
ally interviewed about their general attitudes to both licit and illicit drugs, while more
sensitive questions about personal drug usage were answered by means of self-completed
“drop-and-collect”, hence minimising the likelihood of any non-response bias. Data from
these three surveys have been pooled in this analysis and year dummies used to capture
any exogenous changes in tastes over time.
The summary in Table 1 shows that the proportion of individuals who consumed
alcohol during the 12 months prior to the surveys rose progressively from 77.2 percent
in 1995 to 79.2 percent in 1998, and further to 81.3 percent in 2001. Out of the total
females interviewed, 78.9 percent consumed alcohol in 2001 as compared to 73.9 percent
in 1995. The proportion of male respondents who consumed alcohol also went up from
77.2 percent in 1995 to 81.3 percent in 2001.
6Table 1: Participation in Alcohol Use (Percent)
Female Male Total
1995 73.9 80.9 77.2
1998 76.9 82.0 79.2
2001 78.9 84.2 81.3
Source: NDSHS (1995-2001).
Empirical studies that concentrate on the participation probabilities treat all alcohol
users as a homogeneous group and hence cannot diﬀerentiate between occasional drinkers
and heavy drinkers. It is the heavy users that tend to be associated with the majority
of the ill eﬀects associated with alcohol consumption. Therefore, often this is the more
relevant target group for alcohol-related policies. While the actual amount of each in-
dividual’s alcohol consumption (expenditure or quantity) is not available in the surveys,
information on the frequency of use is provided. The frequency is used as a proxy for the
intensity of consumption. In particular, the observed dependent variable is discrete and
ordinal, taking the values of: 1 for an abstainer (no alcohol consumption in the previous
12 months); 2 for an occasional drinker (drinks 2 or 3 days a month); 3 for a moderate
drinker (consumes alcohol more frequently than weekly but no more than 3 to 4 days a
week); and 4 for a frequent drinker (consumes alcohol at least 4 days a week). Details on
the deﬁnition of the dependent variable, together with that for the independent variables,
are given in the Appendix.
Table 2: Pattern of Alcohol Use (Percent)
1995 1998 2001
Frequent 16.7 16.9 23.7
Moderate 29.3 32.5 24.8
Occasional 34.0 33.4 34.5
Abstainer 19.9 17.3 17.0
Total 100 100 100
Source: NDSHS (1995-2001).
Table 2 shows the average consumption pattern of individuals. The proportion of
frequent drinkers has increased quite signiﬁc a n t l yf r o m1 6 . 7p e r c e n ti n1 9 9 5t o2 3 . 7pe r c e n t
in 2001. It is not unreasonable to speculate that the media coverage of research on the
potential health beneﬁts of daily intake of moderate amount of alcohol, in particular red
wine, may be partly responsible. This rise is accompanied by a fall in the proportions of
moderate drinkers and abstainers. On the other hand, the proportion of individuals who
7Table 3: Percentage Descriptive Statistics on the Frequency of Use
Abstainer Occasional Moderate Frequent Total
Female 19.7 40.2 25.0 15.1 100
Male 14.4 26.8 29.7 29.1 100
Married 15.6 32.8 26.9 24.6 100
Divorced 16.4 34.0 25.7 23.9 100
Widowed 34.5 29.8 15.4 20.3 100
Non− Partnered 17.7 37.9 30.3 14.1 100
Work 10.1 32.2 33.0 24.7 100
Study 26.6 43.1 24.3 6.0 100
Unemployed 18.3 36.7 26.2 18.8 100
OtherAct 25.6 34.1 18.6 21.7 100
Degree 11.8 29.2 32.0 27.0 100
Diploma 12.9 32.5 28.7 25.9 100
Yr12Qual 14.9 36.3 31.0 17.9 100
LessY r12 25.5 38.7 20.0 15.7 100
Capital 18.6 34.6 25.0 21.8 100
Source: National Drug Strategy Household Survey (1995, 1998, 2001).
consumed alcohol occasionally has remained more or less constant at around 34 percent
over the years.
The surveys also provide comprehensive information on individual social, economic and
demographic characteristics of the respondents. These are used as part of the explanatory
variables xi in equation (2), detailed in the Appendix, to explain an individual’s choice
of the level of alcohol consumption.
Table 3 highlights the sample proportions of various population groups for each of the
four categories of drinkers. It appears that males are more likely to be frequent drinkers,
whereas females are more likely to be occasional drinkers. As much as 29.1 percent of
males consume alcohol at least 4 days a week as compared to 15.1 percent of females. On
the other hand, 40.2 percent of females drink occasionally as compared to 26.8 percent of
males. Out of those who are married, 24.6 percent are frequent drinkers as compared to
14.1 percent of single people. Among divorcees, the highest proportion drinks occasionally
but a fairly high percentage are moderate to frequent drinkers.
Occasional to moderate drinking is more popular among those individuals who are
employed. However, a signiﬁcant percentage (24.7 percent) of workers consume alcohol
frequently. Students are mostly occasional drinkers (43.1 percent) or abstainers (26.6
percent) with very few consuming alcohol frequently (6 percent). Unemployed people are
mostly occasional to moderate drinkers although as much as 18.8 percent drink alcohol at
8least 4 days a week. There appears to be a high proportion of abstainers (25.6 percent) and
occasional drinkers (34.1 percent) among those who are pensioners, retirees or primarily
engaged in home duties. There appears to be a pattern within each drinking category
with respect to educational attainment. For the abstainer and occasional drinking groups,
the higher the level of education, the lower is the participation probability while for the
moderate and frequent drinking categories, the more educated individuals have higher
drinking probabilities.
Obviously these descriptive observations for the eﬀects of individual explanatory fac-
tors could be misleading when other factors are not controlled for (Simpson’s Paradox).
More formal econometric models such as the one estimated in this study are needed to
isolate the partial eﬀects due to each individual explanatory factor. This is discussed in
the next section.
Alcohol prices by states of residence, as well as prices of tobacco and marijuana are also
used as explanatory variables. Empirical evidence indicates that alcohol is closely related
to other addictive drugs such as tobacco and marijuana (see, for example Cameron and
Williams 2001, Zhao and Harris 2003). Data on the prices of alcohol and tobacco by states
are obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 2003b). The price of alcoholic
drinks is a weighted average price index for sub-categories of beer, wine and spirits.
Yearly prices of marijuana by states are constructed from quarterly data published in the
Australian Illicit Drug Report by the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (ABCI)
and the Australian Crime Commission (Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence 2002,
Australian Crime Commission 2003). All three price series are deﬂated using the all-items
CPI for individuals’ respective state of residence (ABS 2003a).
4R e s u l t s
Table 4 reports the estimated coeﬃcients and their associated standard errors (SE) of the
OGEV model for three of the four random utility equations, along with the implied mar-
ginal eﬀects (ME), on the probabilities for all four consumption levels (the normalisation is
on the parameter vector corresponding to abstainers). The marginal eﬀects represent the
absolute changes in the probabilities for the respective levels of consumption in response
to unit change in each individual explanatory variable. For each continuous explanatory
9Table 4: Results of OGEV Model for Alcohol Consumption a
Abstainer Occasional Moderate Frequent
ME Coeﬀ.S E M E C o e ﬀ.S E M EC o e ﬀ.S E M E
Constant -1.358 12.600 4.28∗∗ 2.665 9.131 4.77∗∗ ME -1.374 5.28 -2.115
PALC 0.195 -1.585 0.55∗∗ -0.277 -1.422 0.62∗∗ 0.808 -0.038 0.67 0.261
PMAR 0.021 -0.120 0.08 0.000 -0.185 0.09∗∗ -0.179 -0.103 0.10 0.007
PTOB 0.147 -0.779 0.49 0.011 -0.937 0.56∗ -0.028 -1.458 0.63∗∗ -0.147
Income -0.052 0.180 0.02∗∗ -0.064 0.438 0.03∗∗ -0.011 0.649 0.04∗∗ 0.076
1998 × 1 -0.040 0.147 0.10 -0.009 0.233 0.11∗∗ 0.041 0.343 0.12∗∗ 0.029
2001 × 1 -0.090 0.475 0.20∗∗ 0.037 0.394 0.22∗ 0.020 0.846 0.26∗∗ 0.092
Capital 0.006 -0.015 0.03 0.009 -0.045 0.04 -0.038 -0.085 0.04∗∗ -0.012
Age 0.036 -0.519 0.08∗∗ -0.174 -0.274 0.08∗∗ -0.003 0.668 0.08∗∗ 0.208
Male -0.024 -0.098 0.04∗∗ -0.134 0.299 0.03∗∗ -0.070 0.689 0.05∗∗ 0.121
Married 0.015 -0.019 0.05 0.038 -0.149 0.05∗∗ 0.037 -0.248 0.06∗∗ -0.035
Divorced -0.020 0.146 0.06∗∗ 0.010 0.152 0.07∗∗ -0.018 0.145 0.07∗∗ 0.003
Widowed 0.035 -0.129 0.07∗ 0.031 -0.283 0.09∗∗ 0.007 -0.358 0.10∗∗ -0.036
Work -0.061 0.335 0.04∗∗ -0.014 0.541 0.06∗∗ -0.030 0.416 0.05∗∗ 0.005
Study 0.080 -0.294 0.07∗∗ -0.006 -0.323 0.08∗∗ 0.070 -0.739 0.11∗∗ -0.085
Unemployed -0.045 0.204 0.09∗∗ -0.021 0.336 0.10∗∗ 0.011 0.424 0.11∗∗ 0.042
#Depchild 0.006 -0.001 0.02 0.019 -0.066 0.02∗∗ 0.024 -0.107 0.02∗∗ -0.015
Degree -0.053 0.174 0.04∗∗ -0.059 0.462 0.06∗∗ -0.010 0.541 0.06∗∗ 0.051
Diploma -0.060 0.274 0.04∗∗ -0.027 0.471 0.05∗∗ 0.061 0.525 0.05∗∗ 0.039
Yr12Qual -0.061 0.277 0.05∗∗ -0.026 0.474 0.06∗∗ 0.049 0.518 0.06∗∗ 0.037
ρ 0.516 0.12∗∗ 0.050
a SE: standard errors; ME: marginal eﬀect on probabilities; ∗signiﬁcant at 10% level; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%
level. The reference individual is non-partnered, undertakes “other” activities, has less than Year 12
education and is surveyed in 1995.
variable this relates to one unit increase in the explanatory variable, while for dummy
variables it represents the change in probabilities when the variable changes from 0 to 1,
all evaluated at the means of all of the other explanatory variables.
The ﬁr s tr e s u l tt on o t ei nT a b l e4i st h a tt h ep a r a m e t e rρ is estimated to be 0.52 and
is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 1% level. ρ is also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 1 at 1% level. Although the correlation coeﬃcient between categories cannot be
written explicitly in closed form (Small 1987), an estimate of 0.52 for the parameter ρ
implies a fairly strong correlation between categories that are neighbours in the choice
ordering. Small (1987) performed some numerical integrations for the standard OGEV
model and showed that an estimate of ρ =0 .5 implies a correlation of about 0.354 between
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Figure 1: Sample Proportions, Average Predicted Probabilities and Predicted Probabili-
ties at Average Covariate Values
are statistically signiﬁcant at either 5% or 10% levels.
Before turning to the eﬀects of individual covariates, the observed sample propor-
tions along with the predicted probabilities (evaluated at sample means) and the average
predicted probabilities from the OGEV model are presented in Figure 1. Both of these
predicted probabilities closely mimic the observed sample proportions, thereby giving a
clear indication as to the adequacy of the estimated model.
So what do the results tell us about the impacts of individual explanatory factors
on a typical Australian’s probabilities of consuming diﬀering levels of alcohol? Starting
with prices, via excise duty predominantly a (potential) policy variable, an increase in
own price causes reductions in utilities for all three drinking categories, but the impact
on the frequent drinkers is not statistically signiﬁcant. This result of price insensitivity
for the heavy drinkers is interesting, especially for policy makers, as it indicates that a
change in alcohol price is not important for people who are already drinking frequently:
an indication of demand being price inelastic for possibly addicted users.
11However, the probability of frequent drinking can still change signiﬁcantly in response
to an alcohol price rise, due to the signiﬁcant reductions in utilities for the other groups
and therefore a change in the ranking of the four utilities. Related, it may be worthwhile
to point out that the sign of the coeﬃcient for each choice category only indicates the
direction of marginal change in utility for that category from a unit change of a particular
explanatory variable, but not necessarily the direction of change in the probability for that
category. This is evident from the opposite signs observed for the estimated β coeﬃcient
and the marginal eﬀect on the probability in some cases in Table 4. For example, the
utilities for all categories/levels of consumption can be increased due to a price reduction,
but changes in probabilities can be either positive or negative, depending on the relative
sizes of the utility changes, with the total probability changes summing to zero. Thus,
in response to a 10% increase in alcohol price, the marginal eﬀects in Table 4 indicate
reductions in probabilities for the occasional and moderate drinking by 0.028 and 0.018
respectively, but increases the probabilities of being an abstainer and a frequent drinker
by 0.020 and 0.026, respectively. Note all prices and income variables enter the equations
in natural logarithmic form (see Appendix).
It is also interesting to see how an individual’s participation decision is aﬀected by
the prices of related drugs such as marijuana and tobacco. For instance, an increase in
the price of marijuana results in a lower probability for moderate drinking and increases
the chances of being an abstainer. However, it also slightly increases the probability
for frequent drinking. These mixed ﬁndings may suggest that in response to a rise in the
price of marijuana, for some individuals there is a substitution eﬀect towards more alcohol
consumption, increasing the probability of frequent drinking, while those individuals for
whom alcohol is a complement for marijuana, may choose to quit alcohol along with
marijuana (increasing the probability of abstention).
On the other hand, an increase in tobacco price results in lower probabilities for the
moderate and frequent drinking groups, but increases the probability of being an abstainer
or occasional drinker. This tends to suggest that alcohol is a complement for tobacco such
that when the price of tobacco goes up individuals choose to consume less alcohol thus
shifting towards occasional drinking or abstention. The marginal probability indicates
that a 10% increase in the price of marijuana leads to a higher participation probability
12of 0.002 for the abstainer and 0.001 for the frequent drinker while it lowers the drinking
probability by 0.003 for moderate drinking. A 10% increase in tobacco price increases the
chances of being an abstainer or an occasional drinker by 0.015 and 0.001 respectively
but reduces the drinking probabilities by 0.001 and 0.015 for the moderate and frequent
drinking groups. For an Australian population of 20 million, these marginal eﬀects are
non-trivial implying, for example a 10% increase in the price of marijuana (is estimated
to result) in: 55,800 fewer moderate drinkers; an increase of 41,400 in the number of
abstainers; a marginal 200 more individuals being occasional drinkers; and 14,200 more
frequent drinkers. Similarly, a 10% rise in the tobacco price translates into 293,400 less
frequent drinkers and 22,400 fewer moderate drinkers (who thereby shift their drinking
patterns towards less frequent drinking or abstention, increasing the number of occasional
drinkers by 22,200 and the number of abstainers by 293,600).
Table 5: Probability Elasticities
Abstainer Occasional Moderate Frequent
PALC 1.327 -0.819 -0.636 1.114
PMAR 0.141 0.000 -0.099 0.030
PTOB 1.001 0.033 -0.040 -0.626
Income -0.354 -0.191 0.145 0.323
The marginal price eﬀects are also converted into participation elasticities as given in
Table 5. These elasticities show percentage changes, rather than absolute changes, in the
participation probabilities in response to a 1% change in the explanatory variable. For
example, a cross-price elasticity of -0.626 for the frequent drinkers indicates that a 1%
increase in tobacco price will result in a 0.626% relative reduction in the probability value
of frequent drinking.
Attention is next turned to income. From Table 4, an increase in annual household
income reduces the utilities of all three categories. However, this translates into negative
marginal probability eﬀects for abstainers and occasional drinkers but positive eﬀects for
the moderate and frequent drinking groups. Thus, a 10% rise in real annual household
income decreases probabilities of abstention and being an occasional drinker, by 0.005
and 0.006, but increases those of moderate and frequent drinkers by 0.004 and 0.008
respectively. The last row in Table 5 shows the corresponding income elasticities for all
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Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities: Eﬀect of Income
purpose, the eﬀects of income on consumption probabilities are plotted in Figure 2. The
most signiﬁcant eﬀect is clearly the sharp rise in the probability of frequent consumption
as income rises.
Consumption probabilities are also signiﬁcantly related to demographic variables. The
eﬀects of age are depicted in Figure 3. While the probability of being an abstainer
remains more-or-less constant across age groups, the participation probabilities for all
other categories are clearly sensitive to an individual’s age. It is interesting to see how
the probability of being an occasional drinker decreases rather steeply for older individuals
while the odds of being a moderate drinker changes only slightly with age. On the other
hand, the probability for frequent drinking increases signiﬁcantly for older individuals.
T h i ss e e m st op o i n to u tt h a to l d e ri n d i v i d u a l st e n dt ob em o r ef r e q u e n td r i n k e r sb u tt h e
younger ones are rather occasional and moderately frequent drinkers. A high probability
of frequent drinking among older individuals can well be a consequence of addiction where
individuals’ consumption of alcohol gradually increases over time because of the addictive
nature of alcohol (Becker and Murphy 1988).
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Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities: Main Activity
males are 2.4% more likely to be abstainers but 13.4% more likely to be occasional drinkers.
However, males are 3.7% more likely to be moderate drinkers and have almost twice the
probability of being a frequent drinker than females.
In terms of an individual’s main activity, the probability of being an abstainer is
distinctly higher for students relative to those who work, are unemployed or are primarily
engaged in home duties (Figure 5). For the occasional drinking group, the probabilities
do not seem to be much related to individuals’ main activities such that an individual has
about a 35% chance of drinking alcohol irrespective of what his/her main occupation is.
Individuals who work have the highest chances of being in the moderate drinking group.
For the heavy drinkers, other factors controlled being equal, the highest participation
relates to unemployed individuals, while those who work are equally likely to drink as
individuals who are engaged in home duties. However, those who study have markedly
low chances of drinking frequently.
It is interesting to compare the observed sample proportions in Table 3 for the work
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Figure 6: Observed Proportions: Main Activity
5; the latter controls for the eﬀects of all other explanatory variables. They show some
marked diﬀerences; for example, for the abstainer category, while the predicted proba-
bilities are rather close to the observed probabilities for those who work and study, the
model predicts much lower probabilities for those who are unemployed (12.6% compared
to an observed 18.3%) or who are engaged in home duties (17.1 and 25.6%). Once again,
for the frequent drinkers, while people who work are shown to have the highest observed
sample proportion of 24.7% among the four activity groups as shown in Figure 6, the
unemployed group is predicted to have the highest probability for frequent drinking once
the other explanatory variables have been controlled for. This suggests that while we
observe the highest proportion of frequent drinking in the working group, it might be
m o r ed u et ot h ef a c tt h a tt h e s ep e o p l ea r ea l s om o r el i k e l yt oh a v eh i g h e ri n c o m e sa n d
education. Once the income and education levels have been controlled for, an unemployed
person is, in fact, more likely to drink frequently than a working person. This highlights
the fact that, while simple descriptive statistics such as the observed probabilities can
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Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities: Educational Attainment
demographic groups, an econometric model is more appropriate in isolating the partial
eﬀect of a particular factor when other variables are controlled at the same levels.
Finally, Figure 7 shows the probability of consumption with respect to educational
a t t a i n m e n t .I ts e e m st h a tt h em o r ee d u c a t e d ,t h em o r el i k e l yap e r s o ni st ob ed r i n k i n g
more frequently. For the abstainers, those with less than year-12 qualiﬁcations have a
relatively higher probability (of about 18%). Similarly, for the occasional drinking group
the probabilities are highest for those with less than year-12 qualiﬁcations, while degree
h o l d e r sh a v et h el o w e s tp r o b a b i l i t y . O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,t h ec o n v e r s ei sf o u n df o rt h e
moderate and frequent drinking groups, where the more educated individuals have higher
chances than those with lower education. The marginal eﬀects indicate that for the
moderate drinking category, those who have a degree have 6.1% more chances and those
with a diploma or year-12 qualiﬁcations have about 5% more chances of drinking than
individuals with less than year-12 education. In the frequent drinking category, degree
holders are 5.1% more likely and those with diploma or year-12 qualiﬁcations are about
4% more likely to drink than the less educated individuals. Once again, if we compare the
18predicted probabilities to the observed ones (in Table 3), we ﬁnd that the model predicts
signiﬁcantly diﬀerences from the observed sample probabilities for certain groups.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This study investigates the intensity of alcohol consumption of Australian individuals.
Here, the intensity of use, as measured by the frequency of consumption, is observed as
the result of a discrete choice problem where the individuals’ preferred choice is obtained
by maximising random utilities from alternative choices. As is common in survey data,
these discrete choices of consumption levels exhibit a natural ordering. Previous studies
have mostly used Ordered Probit or Logit formulations to model such outcomes. While
such models provide an ease of estimation, they require restrictive assumptions about the
nature of the observed dependent variable. In particularly, these models are inﬂexible due
to the speciﬁcation of a single latent and also that they are inconsistent with RUM.
An alternative choice of model would be the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model which
is more ﬂexible and consistent with RUM. Much as this speciﬁcation looks attractive in
terms of its computational properties, it embodies the undesirable property of IIA. In this
paper the preferred model is the OGEV one (Small 1987), that overcomes the drawbacks
of the Ordered Probit/Logit and the MNL models.
Nearly 40,000 observations from surveys between 1995 and 2001 are used to study
the eﬀects of prices, income, and other social and demographic characteristics on an indi-
vidual’s choice of the frequency of alcohol consumption. Four categories are considered:
abstention, occasional drinking, moderate drinking and frequent drinking. It is found
that an increase in alcohol price reduces the probabilities for occasional and moderate
drinking and increases the probabilities for abstaining and frequent drinking, although
the utility of frequent drinkers does not change signiﬁcantly. The cross-price eﬀects in-
dicate that marijuana is essentially a complement for alcohol such that in response to
price rises in marijuana individuals shift from moderate drinking to occasional drinking
or abstention, although a small proportion substitute marijuana by drinking alcohol more
frequently. However, tobacco appears to be a complement for alcohol such that a rise in
its prices reduces the probabilities of moderate and frequent drinking and increases those
of occasional drinking and abstainer categories.
19Signiﬁcant demographic diﬀerences are observed across the four categories of drinkers.
One interesting ﬁnding is that individuals’ drinking patterns shift from occasional and
moderate drinking to heavy drinking as they grow older; consistent with Becker and
Murphy’s (1988) theory of rational addiction. Income levels also signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
drinking behaviour: the chances of frequent drinking increases as income grows. Un-
employed individuals have relatively higher chances of being a frequent drinker. Males
a r em o r el i k e l yt ob em o d e r a t ea n df r e q u e n td r i n k e r st h a nf e m a l e s .T h em o r ee d u c a t e d
individuals are, the more likely they are to consume alcohol frequently and moderately.
These ﬁndings can be useful inputs when designing anti-alcohol campaigns and education
programs as they indicate the potential target groups. In terms of variables amenable to
policies, price and income eﬀects are illustrative as they indicate how much of a change
in price or income aﬀect the probabilities of frequent use. The cross-price eﬀects, on the
other hand, can be useful to gauge the cross-industry eﬀects of any changes in the related
drugs.
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Appendix
• Y : frequency of alcohol consumption for the whole sample; Y =1if not current
drinker, Y =2i fd r i n k i n g2t o3d a y sam o n t ho rl e s s ,Y =3if drinking more than
weekly but no more than 3 to 4 days a week, and Y =4if drinking more than 4
days a week.
• PALC : natural logarithm of real price index of alcoholic drinks.
• PMAR : natural logarithm of real price of marijuana measured in dollars per ounce.
• PTOB : natural logarithm of real price index of tobacco.
• Income : natural logarithm of real household annual income before tax measured
in Australian Dollars.
• 1995 × 1:1 for year 1995. This variable is the reference category for time-eﬀect
dummies and is dropped in the estimation.
23• 1998 × 1:1 for year 1998.
• 2001 × 1:1 for year 2001.
• Capital : 1 if the respondent resides in a capital city.
• Age : natural logarithm of individual’s actual age.
• Male: 1f o rm a l e .
• Married: 1 if married or de facto.
• Divorced : 1i fd i v o r c e d .
• Widowed: 1i fw i d o w e d .
• Non− partnered : 1 if single. This variable is the reference category for marital
status dummies and is dropped in the estimation.
• Work: 1 if employed part-time or full-time.
• Study : 1 if mainly study.
• Unemployed: 1i fu n e m p l o y e d .
• OtherAct : 1 if retired, on pension or perform home duties. This variable is used as
the base of comparison for work status dummies and is dropped in the estimation.
• Degree : 1 if the highest qualiﬁcation is a tertiary degree.
• Diploma : 1 if the highest qualiﬁcation is a non-tertiary diploma or trade certiﬁcate.
• Yr12Qual : 1 if the highest qualiﬁcation is year 12.
• LessY r12 : 1 if respondent has no qualiﬁcation, is still at school or highest qualiﬁ-
cation is less than year 12. This variable is the reference category for educational
attainment dummies and is dropped in the estimation.
• #Depchild : number of dependent children aged 14 or below in the household.
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